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JURISDICTION
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE ABOVE ENTITLED APPEAL IS CONFERRED
UPON THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PURSUANT TO U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(i)( ) ,
1953 AS AMENDED.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court commit error in lailuiHi \mn recognize

the existence of a conflict when reappointing Attorney Laker and
appointing Attorney Froerer of the Public Defender Association, of
Weber County, Inc. to represent the defendant.
2a

Was the representation of counsel, ineffective counsel as

defined by case law and did such actions effectively constitute a
violation of defendant/appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
3.

Did

the failure of the Public Defender Association's

attorneys to secure or even attempt to secure an investigator in

2

this capital homicide case result in a failure to have effective
counsel present an adequate defense.
The Standard of Review
A Sixth Amendment claim grounded upon a conflict of interest
claim requires the defendant make a showing that a conflict exists
and actual prejudice need not be demonstrated in such cases while
ineffective counsel claims are usually a mixed question of law and
fact which are so basic to a fair trial that its infraction can
never be treated as harmless error.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION, AND PROVISIONS,
STATUES AND RULES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Rule

1.10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a verdict of guilty of a first degree
felony, criminal homicide, in the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Weber County, State of Utah on the 9th day of March, 1993
heard by a jury with the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Court
Judge Presiding.
The

defendant

was

sentenced

on

April

5,

1993

upon

his

conviction for criminal homicide to a term in the Utah State Prison
of

five

(5) years

additional 0 - 5

and which may

be

for life enhanced

by

an

years for the use of a firearm in commission of the

offense, to be served at the Utah State Prison.

In addition, after

the jury returned its verdict, defendant entered a guilty plea to a

3

charge of Possession of a Firearm by Restricted Person, a third
degree felony, with the Court sentence to run concurrent with the
sentence for criminal homicide.
On May 3, 1993, the defendant, through Stephen A. Laker of the
Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber County, filed a Notice of
Appeal of all convictions wherein notice was filed with the Clerk of
the Court of the Second Judicial District Court in and for the
County of Weber, State of Utah.
The appeal was originally docketed in the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, but the Utah Supreme Court assigned same to the Court
of Appeals by letter dated September 21, 1993.
Attorney Laker of the Public Defender Association of Weber
County, Inc. filed a brief on behalf of the defendant on November 3,
1993.
Two days later, on November 5, 1993, the defendant/appellant
filed a pro se motion requesting substitute counsel due to conflict
of interest and ineffective counsel.
After

Attorney

Laker

filed

a motion

to

withdraw, this

proceeding was remanded to the Second District Court whereat
Attorney Laker was permitted to withdraw and private counsel, as
opposed to a member of the Public Defender Association of Weber
County, Inc., was appointed to assert defendant' s claims of conflict
of interest and ineffective counsel.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Billy J. Price was initially represented by Earl
Xais, a private attorney, who was hired by the defendant and in
fact,

conducted

the

preliminary

examination

on

behalf

of

the

defendant although Mr. Allen of the Public Defender Association was
initially assigned to conduct defendant's preliminary hearing.
By virtue of defendant becoming non-bailable due to the State
amending the information to an aggravated murder, a capital offense,
the defendant appeared before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde for
arraignment on April 30, 1992 and entered pleas of not guilty to the
two count information.
Appearing with the defendant at such hearing, was Attorney
Stephen Laker, of the Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber
County

who indicated in discussion with the court that he and

Attorney Martin Gravis were co-counsel in this proceeding.

( TR.

April 30, 1992 Pg. 3)
The defendant1 s attorney Martin Gravis, who was
Managing

Associate

of

the

Public

Defender

also

Association,

the

Inc.,

subsequently filed a motion requesting the court proceed in camera
with regard to defendant' s application for expert and investigative
assistance. ( R.30-34 )
The

State

of Utah, prior

to the

hearing

requesting

such

assistance, filed an objection and cited the agreement between Weber
County and the Public Defender Association which provided that
attorneys

hired

by

the

Association
5

did

their

own

reasonable

investigating but could with prior approval of the County secure
such payment by the county. (R.69-70). Defendant's motion came on
for hearing on May 22, 1992 and on the issue of investigative
services the following colloquy occurred:
MR. GRAVIS: Investigatory Services. Unless the —
it's extraordinary and the contract provides we go that
the — it wasn't well thought out, it provides that the —
if I need extra investigatory services, I go to my board
of directors, and then if they approve. We come to the
court and to the county commission. I feel after looking
at that, if there is extraordinary investigatory services,
that is not a proper way to do it, allowing the county to
say whether or n o t —
THE COURT: I don't think it's whether or not you do
it, it's whether or not the pay you the extra for it.
MR. GRAVIS: But I don't anticipate that's going to
be a necessity in this case, but we can argue about it,
but I don't anticipate that we're going to be asking for
extra money for investigatory services s o —
THE COURT:
problem, do you?

Well then I guess you don't have a

MR. GRAVIS: If that does, then we can argue about it
later,... (TR. May 22, 1992, Pg. 10).
Thereafter, on or about July 28, 1992, Attorney Gravis and
Attorney Laker ceased representing the defendant when a conflict
developed between themf and on August 3, 1992, Attorney John Caine
appeared with the defendant and stated to the court as follows:
As your honor is aware, this is Mr. Price here beside
me. Because of a conflict that arose with other members of
the Public Defender staff, he has asked that I get in this
case. (TR. August 3, 1992, Pg. 2)
After further explanation by Attorney Caine of him having a
relationship with some of the victim' s family, which had been over
many years of representing a number of them, and his continued
association with some members of the victim' s family, the following
6

colloquy with the court was held:
THE COURT: If you feel that relationship would in
any way affect your representation of Mr. Price, that's
the question.
MR. CAINE: Believe me, I've been thinking about that
for some time - - some time. It's hard - - it's hard to
answer that. I've reviewed the facts of this case and I
think I'm fairly conversant with what is alleged to have
happened here and feel strongly about some aspects of it,
and you'll see that as we go through.
But I do have - - I have been friends with various members
of the victim's family and I've also represented them and
still consider myself to be friends with some of them. I
know they're not going to be very happy about me being
involved in this case, but don't think they get to pick
either, so I'll continue to assess that. Right at the
moment I do not think it would impact anything that I
would do here. That is my view.
THE COURT: Alright.
MR. CAINE: And I have been over this extensively
with Billy; is that right.
MR. PRICE: Sure.
MR. CAINE: And you and I have talked about this.
THE COURT:

How do you feel about it Mr. Price?

MR. PRICE: I want him to be pretty professional
about it for me to put my confidence in him.
THE COURT: Do you want him to continue as your
attorney, knowing what you know about this situation?
MR. PRICE: If it is not going to cause any kind of
a conflict of interest, sure. (TR. August 3, 1992 Pg. 3On November 9, 1992, when a final Pre-trial hearing was
scheduled, Attorney Caine indicated problems had arisen in his
continued representation of the defendant. (TR. November 9, 1992 pg
2-5)
After which, the following discussion took place between the
7

court and the defendant:
MR. PRICE: Then give me an attorney out of this
county where I don't have to fear them being so close to
Mr. Caine and Ms. Knowlton.
THE COURT: Why didn't you say this three or four
months ago Mr. Price?
MR. PRICE: Because I wanted to give this man a fair
chance. I mean if - - if he's an attorney and if he wants
t© do the right thing then I won't stop that, and I won't
prolong the court, like I said. But if he's not, who's to
say what he is going to let this lady get away with. (TR.
November 9, 1992 Pg. 12)
The

defendant

reiterated

at

such

hearing

that

he

wanted

somebody out of this county who would not be subject to influences
with these people.

(TR. November 9, 1992 Pg. 18)

In light of what was transpiring, Attorney Gravis, the Managing
Associate of the Weber County Public Defender Association, Inc. and
prior attorney for the defendant in this proceeding
in the discussion with the court.

became involved

Attorney Gravis had previously

withdrawn as defendant' s attorney by virtue of a conflict with the
defendant and himself.

After the discussion between the Court and

Attorney Gravis the issue of who would be representing the defendant
was scheduled for further hearing on November

16, 1992. ( TR.

November 9, 1992 Pg 27-34 ) .
During such hearing on November 9, 1992, the defendant had
indicated to the Court in light of what had occurred he did not feel
comfortable with " any of them up here" referring to the Public
Defender Association of Weber County representing him.
After the defendant made such statement to the Court, Attorney
Gravis requested to address the Court concerning the issue of who
8

would be representing the defendant and advised the court when he
was acting as prior counsel for Mr. Price, he was told by Mr. Price
that he was going to keep firing public defenders until the court
appointed Ron Yengich to represent him. The only issue Attorney
Gravis was disposed to address to the Court at that time was the
issue of public defender money. ( Tr. November 9, 1995 Pg. 27-28)
At the hearing of November 16, 1992, Attorney Gravis appeared
and indicated that the only other three individuals within the
Public Defender Association that could be considered, were Attorneys
Allen, Laker and

Froerer.

(TR. November 16, 1992 Pg. 3 - 5 )

The court, after some discussion, indicated that it would not
be appropriate for Attorney Allen to represent the defendant since
he was a partner with Mr. Caine. (November 16, 1992 TR. Pg. 5)
Despite the court being informed that Attorney Laker had previously
been

involved

as

co-counsel

with

Attorney

Gravis

and

having

previously withdrawn when Attorney Caine assumed the representation
of the defendant ( TR. November 16, 1994 Pg. 6 ) , the court advised
the defendant he would be having attorneys Froerer and Laker sit
down with him relative to their representation of him. (TR. November
16, 1992 Pg. 8)
The defendant, when asked what he thought about the situation
indicated to the court as follows:
MR. PRICE: I still feel the same way I did last week
about them sticking together though I mean
THE COURT: I am ruling as a matter of law that these
attorneys are not in anybody's pockets.
MR. PRICE: I am not saying they are in anybody's
pockets, but they are sure sticking together quite a bit.
9

THE COURTS Well, the trouble Mr. Price, is that if
the Public Defender believes that the law is a particular
way and the County Attorney's Office also believes that
the law is a particular way that doesn't mean that they
are sticking together. What that may mean is that that's
what the law is and if that is your concern, that is a
valid concern from the standpoint of this case.
MR. PRICEs I would much rather be comfortable with
counsel outside of the county.
THE COURT:
No sir, that is not - - you1 re not
entitled as a matter of law to that.
MR. PRICE:

I understand. (TR. Nov. 16, 1992 Pg.9 )

At the final hearing relating to appointment of counsel on
November 19, 1992, the court appointed attorneys Laker and Froerer
to represent the defendant, and again asked Mr. Price if he wished
to be heard and the defendant stated as follows:
MR. PRICE: I don't want to aggravate you or upset
you or anything like that, but I still feel..
THE COURT: It's okay, I have already got a headache,
so it's alright.
MR. PRICE:

I just want the court ..

THE COURT:

Say what you feel Mr. Price.

MR. PRICE: I just want some experience. I mean I am
sure Mr. Laker I told him he's a pretty good person, but
for a case like this you have to have the experience.
( TR. November 19, 1992 Pg. 8)
During the same discussion between the court and the defendant,
the following discourse also occurred:
THE COURT:

Okay, let's set it for trial.

MR. PRICE: It's still going to cause a conflict of
interest, and that is what I'm scared of right now.
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THE COURT: Well now if the conflict of interest your
concerned about is the relationship between the County
Attorney's Office and the Public Defender's office, I am
finding specifically that there is not a conflict of
interest.
Now, is there some other conflict of interest you are
concerned about?
MR. PRICE: There is a problem there. I mean, your
the Judge, I can see it, surely you can see it. (November
19. 1992 TR. Pg.9-10 )
After jury selection, the trial proceeded on March 4, 5, 8, and
9, 1993.

At such trial, the State called as witnesses seven (7)

police officers including dispatcher Mitchell; a criminalist; a
medical examiner; three
Kathryn

Scott

(3) witnesses to the shooting death of

(Hairston, De Lavallade, and Kunua);and

two

(2)

relatives of the decedent (Ross and Anderson).
Mr. De Lavallade, who was a neighbor of the decedent, testified
that while not seeing the shooting he saw a black male standing over
the body shouting and hollering all kinds of obscenities (Tr. Vol.7.
Pg. 120)
Jesse Anderson, the decedent' s grandmother, testified

the

defendant sounded angry earlier the night of the shooting when he
was trying to contact her relative to visitation with his daughter
(Tr. Vol.8 Pg. 70 ) .

She also testified the defendant was sneaky,

although she didn* t see him much because she wasn' t around him much.
Additionally, she testified she had a conversation with him on
one occasion where the defendant asked her to hit him because he had
done something wrong to the decedent, Kathryn Scott, and despite the
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decedent' s request that Mrs. Anderson hit him, she wouldn1 t hit the
defendant. (Tr. Vol. 8 Pg 72, 74 ) .
Contrarily, the Defense called no witnesses and the entire
defense portion of the case consisted of playing the 911 emergency
tape, which had been discussed by police dispatcher Mitchell during
the State1 s presentation of its case.
After conviction and sentence, at the request of the defendant,
Attorney Laker on behalf of the Public Defender Association,Inc.
filed a Notice of Appeal and submitted a brief on behalf of the
defendant. Said brief was filed with the court on or about November
3, 1993.
The defendant, on or about November 5, 1993, filed a pro se
motion for appointment of substitute counsel citing conflict of
interest and ineffective counsel and in response thereto defendants
counsel, Stephen A. Laker on December 13, 1993, filed a Notice of
Withdraw.
This matter was returned to the Second District Court for
consideration

of

the

defendant's

motion

for

appointment

of

substitute counsel and Attorney Laker1 s Motion to Withdraw, which
resulted in the appointment of private counsel unaffiliated with the
Public

Defender

Association

of

Weber

County,

Inc.

to

assert

defendant' s claims of conflict of interest and ineffective counsel.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant, Billy J. Price, asserts that he was denied
effective counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment constitutional
rights.

Such conflict of interest was raised and pronounced many
12

times to the District Court by the defendant and such conflict was
of such a nature, that prejudice is presumed.
In the event this court determines that a conflict of interest
does exist but prejudice is not presumed or that the conflict of
interest was not properly raised by the defendant at the trial
level, then the defendant asserts he was denied a fair trial in that
he was compelled to accept as counsel individuals who acted in
concert

and not in his best interest.

Defendant also asserts the Public Defender Association was more
concerned

with

Public

Defender

money

than

in

defendant

afforded a proper and complete defense as evidenced by

being

the failure

of any of the five (5) Public Defender Association members to even
request an investigator be appointed at county expense.
Such monetary concern, as opposed to the zealous representation
of an attorney1 s client is also evidenced by the actions of Attorney
Martin

Gravis,

Managing

Associate

Association, who divulged statements

of

the

Public

Defender

made in confidence to him by

the defendant while he was representing the defendant, when it
appeared the Court may appoint someone other than a member of the
local Public Defender Association to represent the defendant. (Tr.
November 9, 1995 Pg 27-28)
ARGUMENT
I.
DID THE LOWER COURT' S FAILURE TO PERCEIVE THE
CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN APPOINTING ATTORNEYS LAKER AND
FROERER RESULT IN A DENIAL OF DEFENDANT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL.
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484
13

(Utah App. 1991) reiterated the importance of a defendant being
afforded a fair trial by having the effective assistance of counsel
and stated:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.
This right guarantees all criminal
defendants the right
to effective counsel, Tempiin, 805
P.2d at 186, and S6 includes the right to counsel, free from
conflict of interest" State v. Webb, 466 U.S. at 688, 104
S.Ct at 2065). State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App.
1991)
State v. Johnson, cited supra, also addressed the issue of
conflict

of interest and its being a special

subtype of an

ineffectiveness claim and held where a defendant prevails in his
showing that an actual conflict of interest existed which adversely
affected his lawyer1 s performance, prejudice will be presumed by the
court.
Pursuant to Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule.
of the Rules of Professional Conduct there appears a definition of
"firm":
For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
the term "firm" includes lawyers in a private firm and
lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation
or other organization or in a legal services organization.
Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this
definition can depend on the specific facts. For example,
two practitioners who share office space and occasionally
consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be
regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present
themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are
a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be
regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules.
The defendant asserts that the Public Defender Association,
Inc., of Weber County, is a firm as defined by the rules and as such
the imputed disqualification should apply in this case.
14

The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Johnson, cited supra, in
addressing the prior Canon Nine of the former Canons of Professional
Responsibility held as follows:
First, the court must find that there is "at least a
reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable
impropriety" occurred because of the representation. Id.
(quoting Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813
(5th Cir. 1976)
There need not be proof of actual
wrongdoing, however. Id. at 829. Second, the court must
balance "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy"
against the social interest in allowing the defendant to
continue being represented by the lawyer of his or her
choice. Hobspn, 673 F.2d at 828 (quoting Woods, 537 F.2d
at 813 n. 12).
The defendant conceded to the trial court he didn' t have the
right to select private counsel but asked the court to appoint an
attorney

from

another

county

only

after

the

inherent, if

not

outwardly visible, conflicts of interest developed.
Not only was the Public Defender Association, Inc. Of Weber
County

an association or "firm" consisting of only five (5) members

(Attorneys' Gravis, Laker, Caine, Allen, and Froerer), one of the
members, Attorney Caine, had a special and ongoing relationship with
a number of the decedent* s relatives which ultimately resulted in
Attorney Caine' s inability to represent the defendant.
After

such

disqualification

arose,in

light

of

the

other

conflicts that had previously arisen between other members of the
Public Defender Association and the defendant, the court should have
been aware of the conflict and appointed non-affiliated counsel.
The court as well as the Public Defender Association should
have been cognizant of the inherent hesitation of the defendant to
fully confide in members of the Public Defender Association where
15

one of their
family

members had an ongoing relationship with the victim' s

members

reappointing

and

then

further

compounded

the

problem

by

Attorney Laker, who was previously co-counsel with

Attorney Gravis,

to represent the defendant

The Court, in State v. Johnson, cited supra, declared the right
to effective assistance of counsel is so basic to a fair trial that
its infraction can never be treated as harmless error and that a
Sixth Amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special
type of ineffectiveness claim and must be analyzed under a standard
different from that used for other ineffective assistance of counsel
claims:
A defendant who did not object to the conflict at
trial, has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with
specificity that "an actual conflict of interest existed
when adversely affected his [or her] lawyer' s performance.
Webb, 790 P.2d at 73( quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 348, 100 S.Ctc 1708, 1718 (1980); Zepp, 748 F.2d at
135-36,( citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101
S.Ct. 1097, 1103 (1981)). If the defendant makes such a
showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated to prevail on
the claim. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50 100 S.Ct. at 171819; Webb, 790 P.2d at 73. The court will presume the
defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct.
2039, 2046, (1984); Webb, 790 P.2d at 73 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067)
In the instant proceeding, the defendant did object claiming a
conflict of interest on numerous occasions to the court and the
following

discourse

on November

9,

1992

fortifies

defendant's

conflict claim:
MR. PRICE: I don't feel comfortable with any of them
up here though, I honestly don't.
THE COURT:
MR. PRICE:

You don't get to choose your attorney.
I understand I don't, but - 16

THE COURT:
And you don't even know who we are
talking about, yet your not comfortable with them.
MR. GRAVIS:

Your honor, may I address the court?

THE COURT:

Yes you may.

MR. GRAVIS As you know, I was prior counsel for Mr.
Price. I do have some concerns about this. Mr. Price has
Indicated to me In the past that he was going to keep
firing Public Defenders and he thought that he could get
the court to appoint Ron Yenglch to represent him.
THE COURT:
anybody.

He's not going to get the appointment of

MR. GRAVIS: And as managing attorney of the Public
Defender's office, as I say, we don't have a contract with
anybody else and I do have some concerns if he, again,
moves to fire any Public Defender.
At that point, we
don't have anybody left to represent him.
MR. PRICE:
don't mean - -

See, this is what I'm talking about.

I

THE COURT:
Price.

That's what he is talking about too, Mr.

MR. PRICE: See, I don't need that influence. Now,
all of these people sir, are good friends. They have been
working together for years and I am sure that they have
handled many cases.
MR. GRAVIS: That is my concern as managing attorney,
that if we get an attorney outside the Public Defender's
office, public defenders does not have the money to obtain
private counsel for Mr. Price.
THE COURT: Well of course I guess that is a public
expense and if we have . •
MR. GRAVIS:

Well that's not necessary so, the only

way.
THE COURT:

I understand.

MR. GRAVIS: There would have to be hearing and in
order for the county....( November 9, 1992. TR. Pg. 27 28)
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This discourse between the court, Attorney Gravis as Managing
Associate of the Public Defender Association of Weber County and
prior attorney

for the defendant

concern

members

about

of

the

illustrates
Public

the defendant* s

Defender

Association

representing him when it is apparent that the interest of the Public
Defender Association is monetary and has nothing to do with
defendant being effectively represented,
II.
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION ATTORNEYS FAILED TO
PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH UNDIVIDED LOYALTY AND AN EFFECTIVE
DEFENSE RESULTING IN A DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Defendant asserts as the Utah Supreme Court held in State v>
Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah, 1992) this is the same type of inherent
conflict of interest which requires reversal for the defendant's
right to the undivided loyalty of counsel was jeopardized by the
actions of one of the members the Public Defender Association.
The conduct

of Attorney

Gravis, of

the Public

Defender

Association, in divulging confidential statements made to him by the
defendant when monetary considerations became an issue, constituted
a violation of the attorney-client privilege and created a situation
breeding individual as well as public mistrust and the per se rule
of reversal should apply when a conflict of interest manifests
itself so blatantly.
In State v. Brown, cited supra, the Utah Supreme Court was very
mindful of public confidence in the criminal justice system and
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insuring the public' s faith in the impartiality and integrity of the
justice system and the appearance of fairness and impartiality in
the adjudication process must be diligently maintained.
The

Supreme

importance

Court

in

of undivided

State

loyalty

v.

Brown

also

stressed

the

due an indigent defendant

and

recognized the difficulties in determining what sort of unconscious
influences may

affect

such advocacy.

Certainly, the monetary

concerns of the Public Defender Association of Weber County taking
priority over zealous representation of the defendant resulting in
a

violation

of the attorney-client

privilege

and

ignoring

any

consideration of conflict of interest is indicative of the lack of
the undivided loyalty due but not afforded this defendant.
Public

Defender

budgetary

Association,

constraints

or

Inc.

because

of

either
the

through
numerous

T h e

oversight,
changes

attorneys assigned to this proceeding ignored the need

of

for an

investigator which the defendant needed in preparing and presenting
a full and unfettered defense, especially since he was incarcerated
awaiting trial and could not seek out witnesses or facts in his own
defense.
Attorneys Laker and Froerer, who conducted the actual trial
defense of the defendant, were members of the same Association as
Attorneys Caine and Gravis and not one of them sought or perceived
the need for making request of the county for costs in hiring an
investigator, despite a central issue in this capital homicide
proceeding

being

prior

conduct

between

the

decedent

and

defendant. In fact, a prior assaultive incident involving the
19

the

decedent and the defendant was testified to and received by the
court (TR. Vol, 8 Pg.59-61 ) .
The defendant, whose entire defense presentation consisted of
playing the 911 emergency recording to the jury (TR.

Vol.9 Pg.8-9)

was incarcerated awaiting trial and unable to seek out any witnesses
to his relationship with the decedent and his theory of the case.
The defendant' s attorneys advanced the proposition in their
opening statement that there was a great deal of animosity between
the decedent' s family and the defendant, even instances where the
defendant had been threatened by them. There was also discussion in
defendant' s opening statement of defendant' s anger and frustration
in his relationship with the decedent.(TR. Vol 7. Pg 61-71 )
The prosecution requested the court address the issue of the
State presenting to the jury, facts surrounding such relationship
after such opening statement and the court inquired of defense
counsel if they were going to present evidence concerning such
issue.

Attorneys Laker and Froerer indicated to the court that the

defense was hoping to present evidence on such matter to the jury
but didn't know if they could. (Tr.Vol.8 Pg 4-5)
Without securing witnesses or presenting testimony to establish
the mental state of the defendant from such prior relationship of
the defendant to the decedent, there was Tittle, if any, evidence
available for the jury to consider the lesser included offense of
manslaughter, based upon a showing of "extreme emotional disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse". The failure
20

of defendant' s counsel leads directly to the conclusion that the
claim of defendant that he was not effectively represented is well
founded.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above and foregoing arguments the defendant,
BILLY JOE PRICE ,requests this court grant defendant a new trial.
/o

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1995.

DONALD W. PERKINS
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to State of Utah, Office of Attorney General,
THOMAS B. BRUNKER, 236 State Capitol, Salt lake City, Utah 84111 on
this

I /

day of April, 1995.

RONALD W. PERKINS
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Appendix "A"
Public Defender Contract
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AGREEMENT FOR INDIGENT
CRIMINAL LEGAL SERVICES
THIS AGREEMENT dated as of the _J

day of ^

0

^ r i/jf

1990, entered into by and between WEBER COUNTY CORPORATION, Utah
(the "County"), a political subdivision and body politic under the
laws of the State of Utah, and THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION OF
WEBER COUNTY> INC. (the "Association"), a non-profit corporation
duly organized, existing and in good standing under the laws of the
State of Utah.

W I T N E S S E T H :

WHEREAS, the COUNTY, pursuant to Chapter 32 of Title 77,
Utah Code Annotated, is required to furnish legal defense for
indigent persons charged in Weber County in criminal cases in the
courts and various administrative bodies of the State of Utah; and
WHEREAS, the ASSOCIATION is a non-profit corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah for the
purpose of providing legal services in criminal cases to indigent
persons pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-32~6(a); and
WHEREAS, the COUNTY and ASSOCIATION are mutually desirous
to enter into an agreement to provide criminal legal services to
indigent persons;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual
promises and covenants herein contained, the parties hereto agree
as follows:
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^reement for Indigent
Criminal Legal Services
page 2
Section I
Term
A.

Commencement.

January 1, 1990.
years.

This contract shall

commence

on

The original term of the contract shall be four

After the original term, this contract shall continue on a

continuing four year term basis unless canceled by either the
COUNTY or the ASSOCIATION prior to the beginning of any four year
term.
B.

Termination of the Agreement. This Agreement may be

canceled by either party after the original term by sending written
notice of cancellation to the other party at least three months
prior to the end of the calendar year.

Section II
Payment
The COUNTY agrees to pay the ASSOCIATION for legal and
investigative services as follows:
A.
year of 1990.

Amount. A base amount of $164,000 for the calendar
Each year thereafter, any adjustment shall be made

according to the average percentage increase granted to merit
employees of the COUNTY.

The average percentage increase in the

salaries of the merit employees of the COUNTY shall be similarly
added to the base amount of this contract. The base amount will be
adjusted annually during the COUNTY'S budget process.

The first

adjustment shall be included in the 1991 COUNTY budget, adding to
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jiaement for Indigent
criminal Legal Services
page 3
the

base

all

appropriate

increases

granted

employees during the 1990 calendar year.

to

COUNTY

merit

If the criminal cases

filed by the COUNTY increases twenty percent (20%) or more over the
County Attorney's case load in 1989, the parties shall renegotiate
the base amount of the contract.
B.

Payment Schedule.

Payments from the COUNTY to the

ASSOCIATION shall be made in twelve (12) equal installments paid
the first of each month.
C.

Additional Compensation - Appeals. The ASSOCIATION

shall be responsible to file, brief and argue, if required, without
additional compensation the first fifteen (15) appeals before any
appropriate state court during any calendar year. The ASSOCIATION
shall be paid at a rate of $500 for each additional appeal above
fifteen (15) filed in any calendar year as required in Section
III. A. below.

To receive compensation, an appeal brief must be

filed with the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court.
Mere notice of appeal without further action will not qualify for
additional compensation.

Any federal appellate court appearance

required to be made by the ASSOCIATION shall require additional
compensation, which shall be negotiated by the parties.
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^einent for Indigent
jriminal Legal Services
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Section III
Services Provided by the ASSOCIATION
A.

Legal Services.

The

ASSOCIATION

shall

provide

qualified legal counsel. All attorneys providing services shall be
members of the Utah State Bar in good standing.
The ASSOCIATION shall provide legal counsel for any
indigent adult eighteen

(18) years or

older, or any

juvenile

certified by the Juvenile Court to stand trial as an adult, or any
juvenile who is charged as an adult with a criminal offense by the
State of Utah in Weber County.

Such representation shall be as

required by Chapter 32 of Title 77 of Utah Code Annotated or any
successor statute or court decision regarding indigent criminal
defense.
The ASSOCIATION shall also be responsible annually
for

all

criminal
providing

indigent criminal
proceedings

appeals, criminal

for which

the COUNTY

defense pursuant to Chapter

writs, and

other

is responsible

for

32, Title 77, or other

provisions of the law brought before the courts of the State of
Utah or courts of the United

States and originating in Weber

County.
B.

Staff.

The ASSOCIATION shall provide an adequate

number of attorneys to act as defense counsel.
The attorneys hired by the ASSOCIATION shall do
their own reasonable investigating.
other

facilities

(secretarial

The ASSOCIATION shall provide

staff)
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as

necessary

to

provide

ceo

^ement for Indigent
criminal Legal Services
jpage 5

support for the attorneys.

Cost of all hired investigators (with

prior approval by the Chairman of the ASSOCIATION, the County
Commission member of the ASSOCIATION, and the appropriate court)
shall be paid by the COUNTY.
C.

Other Expenses.

The ASSOCIATION shall be solely

responsible for all office expenses relating to the ASSOCIATION.

Section IV
Location of ASSOCIATION
The ASSOCIATION shall maintain an office to conduct their
business.

The current location is 2568 Washington Boulevard,

Ogden, Utah 84401.

The ASSOCIATION shall notify the COUNTY in

writing of any change of address at least two (2) weeks before any
move.

Section V
Independent Contractor Status
The ASSOCIATION is an independent contractor with the
COUNTY.

The ASSOCIATION

shall be solely

responsible

for all

appropriate social security, workman's compensation, and pension
plans as required by law.
the

individuals

hired

It is understood and agreed that none of
or

contracted

by

the

ASSOCIATION

are

employees of the COUNTY.

070
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Section VI
Conflicts of Interest
The ASSOCIATION and the COUNTY recognize that in previous
years problems have arisen in the area of conflicts of interest.
To help alleviate the problems, the ASSOCIATION shall contract with
at

least

three

law

firms

and/or

individual

practitioners

not

associated in fact. The ASSOCIATION shall continue to use its best
efforts to maintain a staff

of

independent attorneys who

are

independent from each other.
The appointment of counsel outside the ASSOCIATION shall
only

occur

when

the court

determines

that

all the

attorneys

contracted with the ASSOCIATION have a conflict of interest with a
defendant.
Upon

a ruling

by

the

court that all the

attorneys

contracted with the ASSOCIATION have a conflict of interest in
representation of a particular defendant, the COUNTY shall be
responsible to contract with outside legal counsel for a defendant.
The

ASSOCIATION

shall

not

be

liable

for

any

legal

costs

of

defending such an individual.

Section VII
Qualification for Indigent Representation
A.
attorneys
defender

Affidavit

shall
to

of

interview

determine

if

Impecuniosity.

The

ASSOCIATION'S

any

defendant

requesting

the

individual

qualifies.
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public
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the
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individual

qualifies, the attorney

shall

prepare an affidavit

listing all assets and income of the individual.

The affidavit's

form shall be approved by the County Attorney, the Judges of Weber
County, and the ASSOCIATION.

The ASSOCIATION shall notify the

appropriate court when an individual who has previously qualified
for

indigent

legal

counsel

is

no

longer

eligible

for

those

services.
B.

Private Criminal Clients. The attorneys contracting

with the ASSOCIATION shall not be prohibited from maintaining a
private criminal practice.

The ASSOCIATION'S attorneys shall not

represent, in the referred criminal case, individuals referred to
the attorney for screening regarding indigency qualifications who
subsequently do not qualify for such representation.

This shall

not prohibit another attorney contracted by the ASSOCIATION from
being retained by a non-qualifying individual as long as there is
no referral from any other attorney in the ASSOCIATION, and the
contact is made independent from any ASSOCIATION referral.
C.
service

Referrals of Non-Qualifying Individuals. A referral

shall

attorneys.

be

established

by

the

ASSOCIATION'S

contracted

The contracted attorneys shall provide to a non-

qualifying individual a list of other private legal counsel.

No

attorney contracting with the ASSOCIATION shall be placed on the
list.

Any qualified attorney who requests shall be placed on the

ASSOCIATION'S referral list.

30

gre em e n t f o r I nd i g e n t

Criminal Legal Services
page 8
D.

Recoupment

of

Attorney

Fees.

The

ASSOo FAr: : * M,

through its attorneys and the County Attorney, sh « " "i
to urge the courts to adoi t ,i <o>«,!« \i
c»"»viv U *t f >i 1 iii C hdniits

pinsnaril.

^ *.,;*., r

* imposing aLtorne1-"^ : e<- ; • :•

I n

oeeiion

?/~32a~2,

w^cm

tuue

Annotated .

Section VTTT
County Commission Membership on ihe ASSOC;The
writing

Boanl
the

of

County

ASSOC LAT I uri

Ci mum i *•,«• i in n -rs . ... . . d^sjoiMtcone

ot"

i i s

representative on the Board of Trustees of t;h
Commissioners'

representative

sha i

n

i

. eir.b^-rs

*>

;

-^

• i
i

• ••
,artieipat r.j

trustee.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto H-IVP PV *><:W\ .•. I 1 I. i,:;
Agreement the day and year firs

wo v»i it. Inn,
WEBER COUNTY CORPORATION"

By:

C^y^SJoArtJ$x
William A. Bailey, Chair

THE WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances,
AMENDMENT II
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and hear Anns shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
No Soldier shall, in tune of peace be quartered in an) Iioiibo, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in tune of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation
18

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. X I I

AMENDMEN1
In ail criminal prosecutions., the accused snail enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,
AMENDMENT X
The powers not del ^tia ted u. * ].e United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to tin- States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified
as follows: New Jersey, Nov. 20, 1789; Maryland, Dee. 19, 1789; North Carolina,
Dee. 22, 1789; South Carolina, Jan. 19, 1790; New Hampshire, Jan. 25, 1790; Delaware,
Jan. 28, 1790; Pennsylvania, Mar. 10, 1790; New York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island,
June 15, 1790; Vermont, Nov. 3, 1791 j Virginia, Dec. 15, 1791. Connecticut, Georgia
and Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939,
respectively.

AMENDMENT XI
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
History: Proposed by Congress on September 5, 1794; declared to have been rati-

lied by the legislatures of three-fourths
of all the states on J a n u a r y 8, 1798.

AMENDMENT XII
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by "ballot
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall, not be an
19
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AMEND.

XIII, 11

CONSTITUTION" OF T H E UNITED STATES

inhabitant of the same state with themselves: they shall name in their
ballots the person voted i."or as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as VicePresident, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall
sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of
the United States directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority,
then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of
a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority
of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of
Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice
shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following,
then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The person
having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the VicePresident, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest
numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum
for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a
choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
History: Proposed by Congress on Decomber V2, 1803; declared to have been

ratified, by the legislatures ot three-fourths
of the states ou September -f>; 1804.

AMENDMENT XIII
Section 1.
Neither slaver} nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2.
Congress shall have power <o enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
History: Proposed by Congress on Februarv 1, IS05; declared to have been rati-

lied by the legislatures of twenty-seven of
the thirty-six states on December IS, I860.
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CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. X I V , § 5

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
21
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781

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

plinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on
the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in
recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act
upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether or
not discipline should be imposed for a violation and
the severity of a sanction depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the
violation, extenuating factors and whether there
have been previous violations. Disciplinary action
shall be governed by the Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar, and the burden of proof shall be
on the State Bar to sustain any allegation of violation
by clear and convincing evidence.
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of
action, nor should it create any presumption that a
legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed
to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can
be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a
just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority does not imply that an antagonist
in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing
to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing
in the Rule should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern
or affect judicial application of either the client-lawyer or work product privilege. Those privileges were
developed to promote compliance with law and fairness in litigation. In reliance on the client-lawyer
privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled disclosure. The client-lawyer privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer
under the Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a
client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that,
as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will
not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of
such information may be judicially compelled only in
accordance with the recognized exceptions to the client-lawyer and work product privileges.
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose
information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to
reexamination. Permitting such reexamination
would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with law through assurances that
communications will be protected against disclosure.
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains
and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule.
The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general
orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative. Research notes were prepared to compare counterparts in the Code of Professional Responsibility
(approved by the Utah Supreme Court February 19.
1971) and to provide selected references to other authorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not
constitute part of the Rules and are not intended to
affect the application or interpretation of the Rules
and Comments.
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Rule 1.2

TERMINOLOGY
"Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be
true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.
"Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication
of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in
question.
"Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in
a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization. See
Comment, Rule 1.10.
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a
purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant
information.
"Knowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual
knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and a
shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional
corporation.
"Reasonable" or "reasonably," when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer, denotes the conduct of a
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
"Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when
used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer
believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
"Reasonably should know," when used in reference
to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in
question.
"Substantial," when used in reference to degree or
extent, denotes a material matter of clear and
weighty importance.
Client-Lawyer R e l a t i o n s h i p
Rule 1.1. C o m p e t e n c e .
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to
a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation.
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to
paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.
In a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawver knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to
make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law.
(d) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with
the client regarding the relevant limitations on the
lawyer's conduct.
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Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.
Rule 1.4. Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.
Rule 1.5. Fees.
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for,
charge or coll?ct an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A
fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in
excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as
guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
\2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer:
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services:
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained:
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances:
(6) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client:
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
and
(81 Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
>b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented
the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or
within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter for which the service is rendered, except in a
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method
by which the fee is to be determined, including the
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal,
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the
recovery and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.
Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement
stating the outcome of the matter and. if there is a
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and
the method of its determination.
td) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement
foi, charge or collect:
(1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the
payment or amount of which is contingent upon
the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of
alimony or support, or property settlement in
lieu thereof; or
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
<e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not
in the same firm may be made only if:
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(1) The division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representation;
(2) The client is advised of and does not object
to the participation of all lawyers involved; and
(3) The total fee is reasonable.
Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client consents after disclosure.
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the
extent the lawyer believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a
criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm, or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another;
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of
which the lawyer's services had been used;
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client or to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved; or
(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law.
(c) Representation of a client includes counseling a
lawyens) about the need for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or psychological or emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar
serving on the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee.
(Amended effective October 10, 1990.)
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule.
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected: and
{2^ Each client consents after consultation.
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation to each client of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
tc) A lawyer shall not simultaneously represent
the interests of adverse parties in separate matters,
unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation of each will not be adversely affected:
and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions.
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client unless:
ll) The transaction and terms on which the
lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reason-
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able to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner
which can be reasonably understood by the client; and
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in
the transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client unless the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as
parent, child, sibling or spouse any substantial gift
from a client, including a testamentary gift, except
where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a
client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a
portrayal or an account based in substantial part on
information relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance
to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except:
( D A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation the repayment of which may
be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client
may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on
behalf of the client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for
representing a client from one other than the client
unless:
(1) The client consents after consultation;
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's
independence of professional judgment or with
the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) Information relating to representation of a
client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients
shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients or in a
criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty
or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents
after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved
and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is
independently represented in making the agreement
or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising
that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent,
child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in
a representation directly adverse to a person who the
lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that
the lawyer may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the
lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
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Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: Former Client.
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in
a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a
substantially factually related matter in which
that person's interests are materially adverse to
the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a
client or when the information has become generally known.
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General
Rule.
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of
them shall knowingly represent a client when any
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm,
the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially factually related matter in
which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer
has associated, had previously represented a client
whose interests are materially adverse to that person
and about whom the lawyer had acquired information
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to
the matter.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association
with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter
representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly
associated lawyer unless:
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated
lawyer represented the client; and
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that
is material to the matter.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may
be waived by the affected client under the conditions
stated in Rule 1.7.
Rule 1.11. Successive Government and Private
Employment.
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit,
a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer
or employee, unless the appropriate government
agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a
firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a
matter unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from
any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this
Rule.
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit,
a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows
is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or
employee may not represent a private client whose
interests are adverse to that person in a matter in
which the information could be used to the material
disadvantage of that person, unless the appropriate
government client consents after consultation with
the lawyer. A firm with which that lawyer is associ-

